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Abstract Building on Ben-Avi and Winter’s (2007) work, this paper provides a gen-
eral “intensionalization” procedure that turns an extensional semantics for a language
into an intensionalized one that is capable of accommodating “truly intensional” lex-
ical items without changing the compositional semantic rules. We prove some formal
properties of this procedure and clarify its relation to the procedure implicit in Mon-
tague’s (1973) PTQ.
Keywords Intensionalization · Montague semantics
1 Introduction
Ben-Avi and Winter (2007) proposed a procedure for intensionalization, a method
for mapping an object of an “extensional” type (i.e., type based on atomic types e
and t) into an object of a corresponding “intensional” type (based on e, t , and s).
They used this mapping to convert an extensional semantics for a fragment of natural
language, where all lexical items have extensional denotations, into an intensional
semantics which assigns “intensionalized” denotations to the same lexical items and
This note has its origin in the discussions we had with Reinhard Muskens in Tokyo in early 2007, after all
three of us had heard Yoad Winter present his joint work with Gilad Ben-Avi on intensionalization (see
Ben-Avi and Winter 2007). A previous version of this note, dated December 2009, was cited in Jan van
Eijck and Christina Unger’s textbook (van Eijck and Unger 2011). The section on Montague’s typing
(Sect. 5) is new to the present version.
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which is capable of accommodating new lexical items with “truly intensional” deno-
tations without any change in the grammar. This is supposed to allow a “modular”
development of natural language semantics, where the purely extensional fragment
is first presented in the simplest possible terms, without the machinery of possible
worlds. Intensionalization can also be discerned, in a particularly simple form, in the
semantics of various intensional logics, which are usually built on top of the standard,
extensional language of propositional or first-order logic. The higher-order character
of natural language semantics makes it a less trivial task to find a suitable definition
of intensionalization.
This paper presents an alternative intensionalization procedure that is more gen-
eral than Ben-Avi and Winter’s (2007) in two respects. First, Ben-Avi and Winter’s
procedure is only applicable to objects of types that are either quasi-relational or
e-based—in other words, types that contain no subtype of the form (α1 → · · · →
αn → t) → β1 → · · · → βm → e. This limitation stems from the fact that their type
change scheme replaces t by s → t , but leaves e unchanged. In contrast, the present
scheme uniformly replaces each atomic type a in an extensional type α by s→a to pro-
duce an intensional type α; this uniformity allows the intensionalization procedure to
be defined at arbitrary extensional types. Second, unlike Ben-Avi and Winter’s (2007)
method, where the input is a single extensional object, the method defined here takes
a set of extensional objects of type α parameterized by objects of type s, and returns
an object of type α. This allows a construction of an intensional model from a class
of extensional models viewed as possible worlds; as a result of this, there is no need
to stipulate a sharp distinction between lexical items that are “logical constants” and
others whose denotations are unconstrained, as in Ben-Avi and Winter’s construction.
We give the formal definition of intensionalization in Sect. 2.
Naturally, the present intensionalization procedure generalizes the way an inten-
sional language is usually built on top of an extensional one in formal logic. We take
the extensional language whose sentences are simply typed λ-terms (of type t) con-
taining constants, and interpret it in an intensional model constructed from a class of
extensional models, assigning each constant the denotation obtained from its denota-
tions in the extensional models by intensionalization. For the intended application to
natural language semantics, constants are to stand for extensional lexical items, and a
closed λ-term of type t is to represent a possible sentence meaning, expressing how the
denotations of words may be combined to give a truth value. After intensionalization,
a constant of type α will now denote an object of type α; a closed λ-term of type t will
now express a recipe for combining intensionalized denotations of constants to yield
an object of type t = s → t , or a set of possible worlds.
To give a concrete example, in giving an extensional semantics for a certain fragment
of English, we may use the λ-terms
every man (find (a unicorn)) (1)
a unicorn (λve.(every man (find (λue→t .u v)))) (2)
to represent the subject wide scope and object wide scope readings of the sentence
every man finds a unicorn. Here, each word whose (extensional) denotation is of
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type α is represented by the corresponding constant (in small capitals) of type α. We
assume that determiners have type (e → t) → (e → t) → t , commoun nouns have
type e → t , and transitive verbs have type ((e → t) → t) → e → t . (Note that a
transitive verb can directly combine with its object by functional application in the
case of subject wide scope reading.) Given an extensional model M assigning each
constant c of type α its denotation M(c), the truth value of the sentence under the
two readings is given by the denotation of the above λ-terms in M . Now, suppose that
we systematically intensionalize the semantic types for all syntactic categories, so
that determiners, common nouns, and transitive verbs will now denote objects of type
(e → t) → (e → t) → t, e → t , and ((e → t) → t) → e → t , respectively. Given an
intensional denotation for each constant, the same λ-terms (1) and (2) will still be
meaningful, provided that the variables ve and ue→t are now understood to range
over objects of type e and e → t , respectively; the denotations of (1) and (2) will then
be objects of type t = s → t . The resulting compositional semantics will be able to
accommodate intensional transitive verbs like seeks, treating them as belonging to the
same syntactic category—and hence having the same semantic type—as extensional
transitive verbs like finds. Whereas the denotation of finds will be an object that is
constructed from a collection of objects of type ((e→ t)→ t)→e→ t , the denotation
of seeks will not reduce in the same way to objects of type ((e→ t)→ t)→e→ t . The
compositional semantics, however, will be agnostic to the distinction, and meaning
recipes of the exact same form as (1) and (2) will account for two readings of every
man seeks a unicorn.
An important desideratum for intensionalization is that the resulting intensional
semantics is “conservative” over the original extensional semantics. This desideratum
is somewhat misstated in Ben-Avi and Winter’s (2007) paper for a reason related to
their treatment of “non-logical” lexical items. They demand that validity and conse-
quence be preserved in moving from extensional models to intensional models. Since
their treatment of non-logical lexical items in effect amounts to treating them as free
variables, this is an unreasonably strong requirement, one that easily fails in the “inten-
sionalization” of as simple a language as the language of propositional logic augmented
with a non-logical constant of type t → t . In order to satisfy this desideratum, Ben-Avi
and Winter (2007) had to severely restrict the admissible types of non-logical lexical
items—specifically, they were limited to those types that contain at most one instance
of t , and only at the tail position.
In the present construction of intensional models from classes of extensional mod-
els, the desideratum is, simply put, that the truth conditions of sentences (i.e., closed
λ-terms of type t) in the extensional language be preserved. More precisely, this means
that the truth value of a sentence ϕ in an extensional model M is to coincide with the
truth value of ϕ in any intensional model constructed form extensional models in which
M is the “actual world”. The preservation of validity and consequence for sentences
follows as a corollary. These results are proved in Sect. 3.
Even though the validity of an open formula in a class of extensional models should
not be expected to be preserved in intensional models built from them, it may be of
some technical interest to see to what limited extent this expectation may be satisfied.
For an open formula ϕ in the extensional language to be valid in a class of intensional
models, all instances of ϕ, including formulas in an expanded language containing
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some truly intensional items, must be valid as well. Particularly simple examples
of such formulas are provided by propositional modal logic, where a propositional
variable in a tautology may be replaced by any modal formula to produce a valid
modal formula. This is a rather trivial case, but there are other more interesting cases.
In Sect. 4, we define a class of safe open formulas, and show that for those formulas,
validity in extensional models guarantees validity in intensional models based on them.
The present intensionalization procedure based on the mapping α → α is simple
and natural, but not so familiar. In Sect. 5, we compare it to the procedure implicit in
Montague (1973), which is closer to the practice of linguists. The two procedures can
easily be seen to be equivalent. The chief difference is that in Montague’s approach,
not only the denotations of the lexical items but also the “meaning recipes” associated
with the analysis trees (or “LFs”) of natural language sentences must be modified.
(Sect. 5 does not depend on Sect. 4 and can be read immediately after Sect. 3.)
It is not entirely clear to us whether a fully general intensionalization procedure
such as the one given in this paper is called for in natural language semantics. It seems
to us that the usual practice in linguistics is to introduce as few instances of s as is
required for proper linguistic analysis, rather than adding as many instances of s as
there are instances of e and t .1 Assigning fully intensionalized types to extensional
lexical items may be seen as a manifestation of Montague’s strategy of “generalizing
to the worst case”. Instead, it may be more congenial to the current practice of linguists
to adopt a type-shifting mechanism to intensionalize (and extensionalize) denotations
of phrases and apply it only when it is needed, and only to the extent that it is needed.2
Nevertheless, the very fact that a completely general intensionalization procedure
exists, with a definition so natural as to look almost inevitable, and its equivalence to
a mechanism behind Montague’s PTQ, may interest some researchers concerned with
foundational aspects of semantics.
2 Intensionalization
We begin with some necessary definitions. The set of types over a set A of atomic
types is defined inductively as follows3:
– Every atomic type a ∈ A is a type over A.
– If α1 and α2 are types over A, then α1 → α2 is a type over A.
The type constructor → is assumed to be right-associative, so that α →β → γ stands
for α → (β → γ ). We let αn →β abbreviate α →· · ·→α →β, with “α→” repeated
n times.
Given a family (Da)a∈A of base domains, the domain Dα of objects of type α is
defined for each type α over A by recursion:
Dα1→α2 = DDα1α2 .
1 Cf. von Fintel and Heim (2011, section 1.3.1).
2 The paper by Partee and Rooth (1983) contains two “type-lifting” principles to this effect.
3 In Montague semantics, α→β is usually written 〈α, β〉, but we prefer the notation standard in λ-calculus.
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In concrete examples, we often assume A = {e, t} and Dt = {1, 0}. The elements of
De are individuals and 1 and 0 are truth values.
Let s be a new atomic type not in A. Elements of Ds are called indices or possible
worlds. The intensionalization of type α, written α, is defined by
α = α[a := (s → a)]a∈A.
For example, if α = (e → t) → (e → t) → t , then α = ((s → e) → s → t) → ((s →
e) → s → t) → s → t .
We use simply typed λ-calculus (à la Church) as our metalanguage to denote objects
in Dα , for types α over A ∪ {s}. The type of a variable is indicated by a superscript
at its first occurrence. If ψ is a λ-term of type α → β and χ is a λ-term of type α,
then the application ψχ is a λ-term of type β and denotes the object in Dβ that is the
value of ψ on argument χ . If ψ is a λ-term of type β, then the λ-abstract λxα.ψ is
a λ-term of type α → β and denotes the function from Dα to Dβ which maps x to
ψ . The application of λ-terms is assumed to be left-associative, so that ϕψχ stands
for (ϕψ)χ . Application binds stronger than λ-abstraction, so that λxα.ψχ means
λxα.(ψχ), rather than (λxα.ψ)χ . A sequence of λ’s is collapsed into one, so that
λx
α1
1 . . . x
αn
n .ψ abbreviates λxα11 . . . λx
αn
n .ψ .
For each type α over A, we define the intensionalization and extensionalization
combinators at type α by mutual recursion as follows:
inta = exta = λxs→a .x,
intα→β = λxs→α→β yα.intβ(λi s .xi(extα y i)),
extα→β = λyα→β j s xα.extβ(y(intα(λks .x))) j.
Note that intα is of type (s → α) → α and extα is of type α → s → α.
Remark 1 If α = α1 → · · · → αn → a, we have
intα = λxs→α yα11 . . . yαnn i s .xi(extα1 y1 i) . . . (extαn yn i),
extα = λyα j s xα11 . . . xαnn .y(intα1(λks .x1)) . . . (intαn (λks .xn)) j,
For example, if q ∈ Ds→(e→t)→(e→t)→t , then
int(e→t)→(e→t)→t q
= λy(s→e)→s→t1 y(s→e)→s→t2 i s .qi(λze.y1(λks .z)i)(λze.y2(λks .z)i).
If qi is the quantifier some for all i , i.e.,
q = λks xe→t1 xe→t2 .∃e(λze.∧(x1z)(x2z)),
where ∃e ∈ D(e→t)→t is the first-order existential quantifier over individuals and
∧ ∈ Dt→t→t is conjunction, then int(e→t)→(e→t)→t q equals
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s .∃e(λze.∧(y1(λks .z)i)(y2(λks .z)i)).
Lemma 2 For any type α over A, λxs→α.extα(intαx) = λxs→α.x.
Proof By induction on α. The case of atomic types is obvious. For the non-atomic
case, we have
λxs→α→β.extα→β(intα→β x)
= λxs→α→β j s zα.extβ(intα→β x(intα(λks .z))) j
= λxs→α→β j s zα.extβ(intβ(λi s .xi(extα(intα(λks .z))i))) j
= λxs→α→β j s zα.(λi s .xi((λks .z)i)) j by induction hypothesis





λyα.intα(extα y) = λyα.y
does not hold in general. We call an object y ∈ Dα quasi-extensional if y =
intα(extα y). By Lemma 2, it is clear that y ∈ Dα is quasi-extensional if and only
if y = intαx for some x ∈ Ds→α . We call y ∈ Dα truly intensional if it is not
quasi-extensional.
Note that if x ∈ Dtn→t (i.e., x is a truth function), then inttn→t (λks .x) coincides
with its usual Boolean “generalization” to type (s → t)n → s → t . For instance, the
intensionalization of conjunction ∧ ∈ Dt→t→t is
intt→t→t (λks .∧) = λxs→t ys→t i s .∧(xi)(yi),
that is, the intersection operation on subsets of Ds .4
In general, the intensionalization intα(λks .x) corresponding to a “logical constant”
x ∈ Dα does not necessarily agree with other existing ways of “lifting” x to an object
in Dα . For instance, the first-order universal quantifier over individuals ∀e ∈ D(e→t)→t
can be naturally “lifted” to
λy(s→e)→s→t i s .∀s→e(λzs→e.yzi),
using the universal quantifier ∀s→e ∈ D((s→e)→t)→t over individual concepts (i.e.,
functions from possible worlds to individuals), but this differs from its intensionaliza-
tion,
int(e→t)→t (λks .∀e) = λy(s→e)→s→t i s .∀e(exte→t y i)
= λy(s→e)→s→t i s .∀e(λze.y(λks .z)i).
4 As is customary, we often identify sets with their characteristic functions.
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The point here is that the intensionalization of λks .x is λ-definable in terms of x , but
the universal quantifier over objects of a higher type is not λ-definable in terms of the
universal quantifier over objects of a lower type.5
Another example is “generalized conjunction”, defined for each type α of the form
α1 → · · · → αn → t by
∧α = λyα1 yα2 zα11 . . . zαnn .∧(y1z1 . . . zn)(y2z1 . . . zn).
For instance,
int(e→t)→(e→t)→e→t (λks .∧e→t )
=λy(s→e)→s→t1 y(s→e)→s→t2 zs→ei s .∧e→t (exte→t y1 i)(exte→t y2 i)(extez i)
=λy(s→e)→s→t1 y(s→e)→s→t2 zs→ei s .∧e→t (λxe. y1(λks .x)i)(λxe. y2(λks. x)i)(zi)
=λy(s→e)→s→t1 y(s→e)→s→t2 zs→ei s .∧(y1(λks. zi)i)(y2(λks. zi)i),
which does not equal
∧e→t = λy(s→e)→s→t1 y(s→e)→s→t2 zs→ei s .∧(y1zi)(y2zi).
3 Preservation of Extensional Semantics Under Intensionalization
The object language of our study is that of typed λ-terms built up from basic expres-
sions consisting of constants, each of some type α over A, and countably many vari-
ables for each type α over A. We use boldface variables vα1 , v
α
2 , . . . and boldface λ in
the object language to avoid confusion with the metalanguage. Because of the pres-
ence of constants, whose interpretation we can pick at will, this choice of the object
language is general enough to encompass most “extensional” languages of formal
logic, and is also adequate as a language for representing meanings of expressions in
extensional fragments of natural language in the style of Montague semantics. The
intensionalization of the semantics of these languages serves as a foundation on which
to build richer languages including intensional constructs within the usual framework
of possible world semantics.
An extensional model M of our object language consists of base domains (Da)a∈A
and an assignment of a denotation M(c) ∈ Dα to each object language constant c of
type α. An intensional model consists of base domains (Da)a∈A∪{s} together with an
assignment of a denotation M(c) ∈ Dα to each object language constant c of type α.
5 In fact, in the particular case of the universal quantifier, λ-definability goes the other way around: λks .∀α
is λ-definable in terms of ∀α by
λi s xα→t .∀α(λyα.x(extα y i)).
(The same can be said of equality at different types.).
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We are interested in those intensional models that are built from extensional models
by means of intensionalization.
An object language expression ϕ has the denotation [[ϕ]]M,g in an (extensional
or intensional) model M relative to an assignment g of values to variables. In an
extensional model, g(vαl ) ∈ Dα , whereas in an intensional model, g(vαl ) ∈ Dα . We
let g[x/vαl ] denote the assignment that is like g except that it assigns x to vαl .
[[c]]M,g = M(c),




λxα.[[ϕ]]M,g[x/vαl ] if M is an extensional model,
λxα.[[ϕ]]M,g[x/vαl ] if M is an intensional model.
Note that if ϕ is an object language expression of type α, the denotation of ϕ in an
intensional model belongs to Dα .
If ϕ is a closed object language expression, [[ϕ]]M,g does not depend on g, so we
let [[ϕ]]M = [[ϕ]]M,g for an arbitrarily chosen g.
Given an indexed collection I = (Mi )i∈I of extensional models with the same base
domains (Da)a∈A, we create an intensional model MI based on I, with Ds = I . For
an object language constant c of type α, we let
MI(c) = intα(λi s .Mi (c))
be its denotation in MI .
Let us consider a very simple example to illustrate the above definition. Let A = {t}
and let the vocabulary of the object language include constants c of type t and q of
type t → t . Fix Dt = {1, 0}. There are eight possible extensional models for this
language: M(c) is either 0 or 1, and M(q) must be one of λxt .0, λxt .1, λxt .x , , and
λxt .¬x . Let C = {M1, . . . , M8} be the set of these eight models and let I be a subset
of {1, . . . , 8}. We can construct an intensional model MI out of I = (Mi )i∈I by the
above definition. The denotation MI(c) of c is (the characteristic function of) a subset
of I , and MI(q) is a function from the power set of I to the power set of I . We have
MI(q) = intt→t (λi s .Mi (q))
= λys→t i s .Mi (q)(yi),
so MI(q) y i does not depend on the “global” property of y, but only on its value at
i . In particular,
[[qc]]MI = MI(q)MI(c)
= (λys→ei s .Mi (q)(yi))(λi s .Mi (c))
= λi s .Mi (q)Mi (c)
= λi s .[[qc]]Mi . (3)
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Having defined MI , one can then expand it to a model M ′ for a larger vocabulary
including additional constants, such as the necessity operator  (of type t → t , with
denotation in Dt→t ), whose denotation is truly intensional.
We shall show that equalities exemplified by (3) are completely general and hold
for all sentences in the extensional object language.
If g is an intensional assignment (suitable for MI ), define an extensional assignment
g↓i by
g↓i (vαl ) = extαg(vαl ) i.
We call an intensional assignment g quasi-extensional if g(vαl ) is quasi-extensional
for all vαl .
Lemma 3 Let ϕ be an object language expression of type α, and let g be an intensional
assignment suitable for MI that is quasi-extensional.
1. extα[[ϕ]]MI ,g i = [[ϕ]]Mi ,g↓i .
2. If the β-normal form of ϕ is not a λ-abstract, [[ϕ]]MI ,g = intα(λi s .[[ϕ]]Mi ,g↓i ).
Proof We prove both 1 and 2 simultaneously by induction on ϕ, assuming that ϕ is in
β-normal form. Note that if ϕ is not a λ-abstract, 1 follows from 2 by Lemma 2.
If ϕ is a constant c, then 2 holds by the definition of MI(c). If ϕ is a variable vαl , 2
holds since g is quasi-extensional.
Suppose ϕ = ψχ , where ψ is of type β → α and χ is of type β. Since ϕ is in
β-normal form, ψ is not a λ-abstract. Hence by induction hypothesis,
[[ψ]]MI ,g = intβ→α(λi s .[[ψ]]Mi ,g↓i )
= λyα0 .intα(λi s .[[ψ]]Mi ,g↓i (extβ y0 i)).
The induction hypothesis about χ gives
extβ [[χ ]]MI ,g i = [[χ ]]Mi ,g↓i .
Thus,
[[ψχ ]]MI ,g = [[ψ]]MI ,g[[χ ]]MI ,g
= intα(λi s .[[ψ]]Mi ,g↓i (extβ [[χ ]]MI ,g i))
= intα(λi s .[[ψ]]Mi ,g↓i [[χ ]]Mi ,g↓i )
= intα(λi s .[[ψχ ]]Mi ,g↓i )
and the condition in 2 holds of ϕ.
It remains to consider the case where ϕ is a λ-abstract λuβ.ψ , where α = β → γ
and ψ is of type γ . By induction hypothesis, extγ [[ψ]]MI ,h i = [[ψ]]Mi ,h↓i for all
assignments h that are quasi-extensional.
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extβ→γ [[λuβ.ψ]]MI ,g i = λxβ.extγ ([[λuβ.ψ]]MI ,g(intβ(λks .x))) i
= λxβ.extγ ([[ψ]]MI ,g[intβ(λks .x)/uβ ]) i
= λxβ.[[ψ]]Mi ,g[intβ(λks .x)/uβ ]↓i by induction hypothesis
= λxβ.[[ψ]]Mi ,g↓i [x/uβ ]
= [[λuβ.ψ]]Mi ,g↓i .
(Note that g[intβ(λks .x)/uβ ] is quasi-extensional.) Thus, 1 holds of ϕ. 
unionsq
Note that the condition in part 2 of Lemma 3 does not hold of λ-abstracts. A simple
counterexample is the I combinator λua→b.ua→b:
int(a→b)→a→b(λi s .[[λua→b.ua→b]]Mi )
= int(a→b)→a→b(λi s xa→b.x)
= λy(s→a)→s→b1 ys→a2 i s .exta→b y1 i (exta y2 i)
= λy(s→a)→s→b1 ys→a2 i s .(λza .y1(inta(λk.z))i)(exta y2 i)
= λy(s→a)→s→b1 ys→a2 i s .(λza .y1(λk.z)i)(y2i)
= λy(s→a)→s→b1 ys→a2 i s .y1(λk.y2i)i
= λy(s→a)→s→b1 ys→a2 i s .y1 y2i
= λy(s→a)→s→b1 .y1
= [[λua→b.ua→b]]MI .
(The inequality assumes |Da | ≥ 2 and |Ds | ≥ 2.)
Remark 4 A special case of Lemma 3 is when g = h∗ for some extensional assignment
h, where h∗ is defined by
h∗(vαl ) = intα(λks .h(vαl )).
In this case, we have g↓i = h for all i ∈ I . This special case itself can be proved
directly by induction.
Remark 5 The content of Lemma 3 can be stated entirely within simply typed
λ-calculus, as follows. If ϕ is a λ-term of type α, with free variables zβ11 , . . . , z
βn
n ,
let ϕ be the λ-term of type α obtained from ϕ by replacing each occurrence of a ∈ A
by s → a in the type annotation of ϕ. Then we have
extαϕ[(intβ1 xs→β11 )/zβ11 , . . . , (intβn xs→βnn )/zβnn ]
=βη λi s .ϕ[(xs→β11 i)/zβ11 , . . . , (xs→βnn i)/zβnn ],
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Theorem 6 For any closed object language expression ϕ of type a ∈ A, [[ϕ]]MI =
λi s .[[ϕ]]Mi .
Proof Immediate from Lemma 3. 
unionsq
Now assume t ∈ A and fix Dt = {1, 0}. We call an object language expression of
type t a formula, and a closed formula a sentence. A pointed possible world model
is a pair of the form (MI , i) where i ∈ I . The extensional model Mi is the actual
world of a pointed possible world model (MI , i). We say that a sentence ϕ is true in
a pointed possible world model (MI , i) if [[ϕ]]MI i = 1.
Corollary 7 For every sentence ϕ in the object language and every extensional model
M, the following are equivalent:
1. ϕ is true in M.
2. ϕ is true in any pointed possible world model whose actual world is M.
Let C be a class of extensional models. Call a sentence ϕ extensionally valid in
C if [[ϕ]]M = 1 for all M ∈ C, and intensionally valid in C if [[ϕ]]MI = λi s .1
for all indexed collections I = (Mi )i∈I consisting of models in C that share the
same base domains. Similarly, ψ is an extensional consequence of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn in C if
[[ϕ1]]M = · · · = [[ϕn]]M = 1 implies [[ψ]]M = 1 for all M ∈ C, and ψ is an intensional
consequence of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn in C if [[ϕ1]]MI ∩ · · · ∩ [[ϕn]]MI ⊆ [[ψ]]MI for all indexed
collections I consisting of models in C with the same base domains.6
Corollary 8 Let C be a class of extensional models and let ϕ, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ be sen-
tences.
1. If ϕ is extensionally valid in C, then ϕ is intensionally valid in C.
2. If ψ is an extensional consequence of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn in C, then ψ is an intensional
consequence of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn in C.
In the presence of conjunction (∧) and implication (→) in the object language,
the consequence relation between ϕ1, . . . , ϕn and ψ can be defined as the validity of
ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn → ψ , both in the extensional and in the intensional sense. (Recall that
truth-functional connectives behave as desired in intensional models.) This allows us
to concentrate on validity.
4 Intensionally Valid Schemata
Corollary 8 does not quite give what Ben-Avi and Winter (2007) were aiming for,
because in their method of intensionalization, the denotation of a non-logical constant
6 The intensional consequence relation as defined here corresponds to local consequence in modal logic
(Blackburn et al. 2001).
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of type α is not restricted to quasi-extensional objects in Dα . They start from a class C
of extensional models that is closed under arbitrary change in the denotations of non-
logical constants and obtain by intensionalization a class C′ of intensional models that
is again closed under arbitrary change in the denotations of non-logical constants. (In
their method, intensionalization is only used to determine the denotations of logical
constants in intensional models.) Replacing non-logical constants with free variables,
we can say in our setting that what they were aiming for was preservation of validity of
(and the consequence relation among) open formulas or schemata. This is clearly an
unreasonably high demand and is impossible to achieve in any general terms7; be that
as it may, it will be instructive to see the limited extent to which the present method
of intensionalization preserves validity of open formulas.
The generalization of the notion of validity to open formulas is the standard one.
Let C be a class of extensional models. For an object language expression ϕ of type
t , we say that ϕ is extensionally valid in C if [[ϕ]]M,g = 1 for all M ∈ C and all
extensional assignments g suitable for M ; we say that ϕ is intensionally valid in C if
[[ϕ]]MI ,g = λi s .1 for all indexed collections I consisting of models in C built on the
same base domains and all intensional assignments g suitable for MI .
Lemma 3 does not imply that the validity of an open formula is preserved when one
moves from extensional models to intensional models created out of them, because
not all intensional assignments are quasi-extensional. For example, let
ϕ = →(∧(ut→t)(ut→t⊥))(ut→tvt),
or, in a more readable style,
(
ut→t ∧ ut→t⊥) → ut→tvt . (4)
Let →,∧,,⊥ have the usual interpretation in Mi for all i ∈ I . Then ϕ is exten-
sionally valid in I = { Mi | i ∈ I }, but it is easy to see that there are intensional
assignments g such that
[[ϕ]]MI ,g = λi s .1.
The reason that an extensionally valid formula ϕ with FV(ϕ) = ∅ need not be
intensionally valid is related to the failure of the equality [[ψ]]MI = intα(λi s .[[ψ]]Mi )
when ψ is a (closed) λ-abstract. Let FV(ϕ) = {uα11 , . . . , uαnn }. We have [[ϕ]]Mi ,g = 1
for all extensional assignments g if and only if [[λuα11 . . . uαnn .ϕ]]Mi = λxα11 . . . xαnn .1.
Also, [[ϕ]]MI ,g = λi s .1 for all intensional assignments g if and only if [[λuα11 . . . uαnn ·
ϕ]]MI = λyα11 . . . yαnn i s .1. Now suppose [[ϕ]]Mi ,g = 1 for all i ∈ I and all extensional
assignments g. Then [[λuα11 . . . uαnn .ϕ]]Mi = λxα11 . . . xαnn .1, and this clearly implies
intα1→···→αn→t (λi s .[[λuα11 . . . uαnn .ϕ]]Mi ) = λyα11 . . . yαnn i s .1.
7 As mentioned in the introduction, Ben-Avi and Winter (2007) opted to restrict the types of non-logical
constants to those with a very special form.
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But since [[λuα11 . . . uαnn .ϕ]]MI = intα1→···→αn→t (λi s .[[λuα11 . . . uαnn .ϕ]]Mi ) need not
hold, we cannot infer [[λuα11 . . . uαnn .ϕ]]MI = λyα11 . . . yαnn i s .1.
The open formula (4) should be clearly distinguished from its closure
∀t→t (λut→t .∀t (λvt .(ut→t ∧ ut→t⊥) → ut→tvt )) (5)
or the open formulas in one free variable
∀t→t (λut→t .(ut→t ∧ ut→t⊥) → ut→tvt ), (6)
∀t (λvt .(ut→t ∧ ut→t⊥) → ut→tvt ). (7)
The three formulas (5), (6), (7), unlike (4), remain valid in intensional models. As
mentioned above, the intensionalization of the universal quantifier ∀α still only quan-
tifies over objects in Dα , so the intensional validity of (5), (6), (7) does not imply the
intensional validity of (4).
The intensional validity of (6) and (7) illustrates the fact that extensionally valid
open formulas may remain intensionally valid in certain restricted cases. In what
follows, we give one sufficient condition for an extensionally valid ϕ to be intensionally
valid.
Fix an indexed collection I = (Mi )i∈I of extensional models. We call an object
language constant c rigid (in I) if Mi (c) = M j (c) for all i, j ∈ I .
Let V be a set of object language variables. Let ϕ be an object language expression.
We define two predicates V -safe and V -protected by simultaneous induction as fol-
lows:
– ϕ is V -safe if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
1. ϕ is a constant or a variable.
2. ϕ = ψχ and either
– ψ is V -protected and χ is V -safe, or
– ψ is V -safe, all constants that occur in χ are rigid, FV(χ) ∩ V = ∅, and
χ is ∅-protected.
3. ϕ = λv.ψ and ψ is V -safe.
– ϕ is V -protected if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
1. ϕ is a constant or a variable not in V .
2. ϕ = ψχ and ψ is V -protected and χ is V -safe.
3. ϕ = λv.ψ and ψ is V ∪ {v}-protected.
More informally, if λuβ11 . . . u
βn
n .χ occurs in a V -safe formula as an argument of a
variable in V , then χ cannot contain any non-rigid constants or variables in V , and χ
must be a {uβ11 , . . . , uβnn }-safe formula that does not start with one of uβ11 , . . . , uβnn .
Lemma 9 Let V be a set of object language variables, and let ϕ be an object language
expression of type α. Suppose that g is an intensional assignment such that for all
variables uδ ∈ FV(ϕ) − V , we have g(uδ) = intδ(λks .x) for some x ∈ Dδ . The
following hold:
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1. If ϕ is V -protected, [[ϕ]]MI ,g = intα(λi s .[[ϕ]]Mi ,g↓i ).
2. If ϕ is V -safe, extα[[ϕ]]MI ,g i = [[ϕ]]Mi ,g↓i .
Proof We prove 1 and 2 by simultaneous induction on ϕ. Note that the equality in 1
implies the equality in 2, so when ϕ is V -protected, it suffices to prove the former.
Induction basis.
Case 1. ϕ is a constant c. In this case, ϕ is V -protected. We have [[c]]MI ,g =
MI(c) = intα(λi s .Mi (c)) = intα(λi s .[[c]]Mi ,g↓i ) by the definition of MI(c).
Case 2. ϕ is a variable vα . In this case, ϕ is V -protected if and only if vα ∈ V .
We have extα[[vα]]MI ,g i = extαg(vα) i = g↓i (vα) = [[vα]]Mi ,g↓i by the definition
of g↓i , so the equality in 2 holds. If vα ∈ V , then by the assumption on g, we have
[[vα]]MI ,g = g(vα) = int(λi s .g↓i (vα)) = int(λi s .[[vα]]Mi ,g↓i ), so the equality in 1
holds.
Induction step.
Case 1. ϕ = ψχ , where ψ is of type β → α and χ is of type β.
Case 1a. ψ is V -protected and χ is V -safe. In this case, ϕ is V -protected (as
well as V -safe). By induction hypothesis, [[ψ]]MI ,g = intβ→α(λi s .[[ψ]]Mi ,g↓i ) and
extβ [[χ ]]MI ,g i = [[χ ]]Mi ,g↓i . Hence
[[ψχ ]]MI ,g = [[ψ]]MI ,g[[χ ]]MI ,g
= intβ→α(λi s .[[ψ]]Mi ,g↓i )[[χ ]]MI ,g
= intα(λi s .[[ψ]]Mi ,g↓i (extβ [[χ ]]MI ,g i))
= intα(λi s .[[ψ]]Mi ,g↓i [[χ ]]Mi ,g↓i )
= intα(λi s .[[ψχ ]]Mi ,g↓i ),
and the condition in 1 is satisfied.
Case 1b. ψ is V -safe, all constants that occur in χ are rigid, FV(χ) ∩ V = ∅,
and χ is ∅-protected. In this case, ϕ is V -safe. Note that FV(χ) ∩ V = ∅ implies
that g(uδ) = intδ(λks .x) for some x ∈ Dδ for all uδ ∈ FV(χ). Hence, the induction
hypothesis applies to both ψ and χ and we get extβ→α[[ψ]]MI ,g = [[ψ]]Mi ,g↓i and[[χ ]]MI ,g = intβ(λi s .[[χ ]]Mi ,g↓i ). The fact that g(uδ) = intδ(λks .x) for some x ∈ Dδ
for all uδ ∈ FV(χ) also implies that g↓i and g↓ j agree on FV(χ) for all i, j ∈ I .
Since Mi (c) = M j (c) for all i, j ∈ I for all constants c in χ , we see that [[χ ]]Mi ,g↓i =[[χ ]]M j ,g↓ j for all i, j ∈ I . Thus,
extα[[ψχ ]]MI ,g i = extα([[ψ]]MI ,g[[χ ]]MI ,g) i
= extα([[ψ]]MI ,g(intβ((λks .[[χ ]]Mk ,g↓k ))) i
= extα([[ψ]]MI ,g(intβ((λks .[[χ ]]Mi ,g↓i ))) i
since [[χ ]]Mk ,gk = [[χ ]]Mi ,g↓i for all k ∈ I
= extβ→α[[ψ]]MI ,g i [[χ ]]Mi ,g↓i
= [[ψ]]Mi ,g↓i [[χ ]]Mi ,g↓i
= [[ψχ ]]Mi ,g↓i ,
and the condition in 2 holds.
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Case 2. ϕ = λvβ.ψ , where ψ is of type γ and α = β → γ .
Case 2a. ψ is V ∪ {vβ}-protected. In this case, ϕ is V -protected. By induction
hypothesis, [[ψ]]MI ,h = int(λi s .[[ψ]]Mi ,h↓i ) holds of all h satisfying the following
condition:
for all uδ ∈ FV(ψ) − (V ∪ {vβ}), there is an x ∈ Dδ such that h(uδ)= intδ(λks .x).
(8)
We see
[[λvβ.ψ]]MI ,g = λyβ.[[ψ]]MI ,g[y/vβ ]
= λyβ.intγ (λi s .[[ψ]]Mi ,g[y/vβ ]↓i )
= λyβ.intγ (λi s .[[ψ]]Mi ,g↓i [extβ y i/vβ ])
= λyβ.intγ (λi s .[[λvβ.ψ]]Mi ,g↓i (extβ y i))
= intβ→γ (λi s .[[λvβ.ψ]]Mi ,g↓i ).
[Note that h = g[y/vβ ] satisfies (8).] Hence the condition in 1 is satisfied.
Case 2b. ψ is V -safe. In this case, ϕ is V -safe. By induction hypothesis,
extγ [[ψ]]MI ,h i = [[ψ]]Mi ,h↓i holds of all h satisfying the following condition:
for all uδ ∈ FV(ψ) − V, there is an x ∈ Dδsuch that h(uδ) = intδ(λks .x). (9)
We have
extβ→γ [[λvβ.ψ]]MI ,g i = λxβ.extγ ([[λvβ.ψ]]MI ,g(intβ(λks .x))) i
= λxβ.extγ [[ψ]]MI ,g[intβ(λks .x)/vβ ] i
= λxβ.[[ψ]]Mi ,g[intβ(λks .x)/vβ ]↓i
= λxβ.[[ψ]]Mi ,g↓i [x/vβ ]
= [[λvβ.ψ]]Mi ,g↓i .
(Note that FV(ψ) ⊆ FV(ϕ) ∪ {vβ} and h = g[intβ(λks .x)/vβ ] satisfies (9).) Thus,
the condition in 2 is satisfied.
This completes the induction step. 
unionsq
Remark 10 Remark 5 applies, mutatis mutandis, to Lemma 9 as well.
Theorem 11 Let ϕ be a formula of the object language that is FV(ϕ)-safe. If ϕ is
extensionally valid in a class C of extensional models, then ϕ is intensionally valid
in C.
Proof Let I = (Mi )i∈I be an indexed collection of extensional models in C that share
the same base domains. Let g be an arbitrary intensional assignment suitable for MI .
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Then [[ϕ]]MI,g = extt [[ϕ]]MI,g = λi s .[[ϕ]]Mi ,g↓i by Lemma 9. Thus, if [[ϕ]]Mi ,h = 1
for all i ∈ I and all extensional assignments h suitable for Mi , then [[ϕ]]MI ,g = λi s .1.
unionsq
Here are some examples illustrating the scope of applicability of Theorem 11.
First, all tautologies of propositional logic are intensionally valid. It is easy to see that
all formulas built from propositional variables in V are V -safe, because propositional
variables are V -safe and truth-functional connectives are V -protected. In fact, we need
not invoke Theorem 11 in this case, because all objects in Ds→t are quasi-extensional.
Of course, the fact that propositional tautologies are intensionally valid just means
that the power set of Ds is a Boolean algebra.
A less trivial example is Aristotelian syllogisms, which are of the form
Q1ue→t1 ue→t2 ∧ Q2ue→t3 ue→t4 → Q3ue→t5 ue→t6 ,
where ue→t1 , . . . , ue→t6 are not necessarily distinct variables and Q1, Q2, Q3 are not
necessarily distinct constants of type (e→ t)→(e→ t)→ t . Formulas of this form are
{u1, . . . , u6}-safe, so if they are extensionally valid, one can instantiate u1, . . . , u6 by
expressions denoting truly intensional properties (functions from individual concepts
to sets of possible worlds).
What about first-order logic? Of the usual Hilbert-style axioms,
∀x(ϕ(x) → ψ(x)) → (∀x ϕ(x) → ∀x ψ(x))
is rendered as
∀e(λve.ue→t1 ve → ue→t2 ve) → (∀e(λve.ue→t1 ve) → ∀e(λve.ue→t2 ve)),
where → (of type t → t → t) is written as an infix operator. This object language
formula is {ue→t1 , ue→t2 }-safe and is hence intensionally valid, assuming the usual
interpretation of ∀e and →.
In contrast,
∀x ϕ(x) → ϕ(t)
is rendered as
∀e(λve.ue→tve) → ue→t te,
which is not {ue→t , te}-safe. Indeed, it is not intensionally valid, because not all
individual concepts are constant functions.
Another axiom that is not intensionally valid, this time from first-order logic with
equality, is
s = t → (ϕ(s) → ϕ(t)),
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which is rendered as
se = te → (ve→t se → ve→t te),
where = stands for the equality between individuals in De. This formula is not
{se, te, ve→t }-safe and is not intensionally valid. This is just the well-known failure
of substitutivity in intensional contexts.
Here are a couple of more artificial examples. Let I be an object language constant
that denotes the identity function on De→t in all models in C. Then
u((e→t)→e→t)→t I → u((e→t)→e→t)→t (λve→t .ve→t )
is extensionally valid in C, but not intensionally so. This is because the intensional-
ization of the identity function on De→t is not the identity function on D(s→e)→s→t .
Note that this formula is not {u((e→t)→e→t)→t }-safe because λve→t .ve→t is not ∅-
protected.
Another example is
(ut→t ∧ ut→t⊥) → ut→t (¬vt ),
where ,⊥,∧,→,¬ have the usual interpretation. This formula is extensionally
valid, but not intensionally so. Observe that it is not {ut→t , vt }-safe because FV(¬vt )∩
{ut→t , vt } = ∅.
Note that FV(ϕ)-safety is by no means a necessary condition for ϕ to have the
property in Theorem 11. For one thing, ϕ may be an instance of an FV(ψ)-safe formula
ψ while not itself FV(ϕ)-safe.
5 Montague’s Typing in PTQ
The mapping
α → α,
which replaces each occurrence of e and t by s → e and s → t , and the associated
intensionalization and extensionalization combinators (intα and extα) are not familiar
to linguists. In linguistics, a common practice nowadays is to use the fewest instances
of s that are necessary for adequate semantic analysis, rather than systematically
replacing each occurrence of an atomic type by its intensional counterpart.
In Montague’s original work, however, there was a systematic placement of s in
the semantic types associated with syntactic categories. In PTQ (Montague 1973),
syntactic categories are built from basic categories e and t by means of two connectives
/ and //. The semantic type f (A) associated with a syntactic category A was defined
by the following recursion:
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f (e) = e,
f (t) = t,
f (A/B) = f (A//B) = (s → f (B)) → f (A).
This gives rise to the following association between an extensional semantic type α
and its intensional counterpart h(α):
h(e) = e,
h(t) = t,
h(α → β) = (s → h(α)) → h(β).
This mapping α → h(α) looks quite different from the above mapping α → α. For
example, if α = (e → t) → t , then we have
α = ((s → e) → s → t) → s → t,
h(α) = (s → ((s → e) → t)) → t.
Note that the number of occurrences of s in the two types is different: it is three for α
and two for h(α).
Nevertheless, there is a systematic correspondence between the two approaches.
First, note that f (A) is the type of the extension of an expression of syntactic category
A. The type of the intension of an expression of syntactic category A is s → f (A).
Thus, what we should really be comparing to α is not h(α), but s → h(α). It is easy
to see that the number of occurrences of s in α and in s → h(α) is the same for all α.
Indeed, we can go from one type to the other by repeatedly applying the operation of
changing the order of arguments:
β → γ → δ  γ → β → δ (10)
For example, with α = (e → t) → t ,
α = ((s → e) → s → t) → s → t
 (s → (s → e) → t) → s → t
 s → (s → (s → e) → t) → t
= s → h(α).
In general,
a = s → h(a),
α → β = α → β
∗ (s → h(α)) → s → h(β)
 s → (s → h(α)) → h(β)
= s → h(α → β).
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The domains of the two types in (10) are of course related by the combinator
Cβ,γ,δ = λxβ→γ→δ yβ zγ .xzy
and its inverse, Cγ,β,δ , which shows that the two types are isomorphic (di Cosmo
2005). It easily
isomorphic; indeed, this is witnessed by the pair of combinators Pα and Qα defined
as follows:
Pa =λxs→a . x, Qa =λys→a .y,
Pα→β =λxα→β i s ys→h(α). Pβ(x(Qα y))i, Qα→β =λys→h(α→β)xα.Qβ(λi s. yi(Pαx)).
We have
λxα.Qα(Pαx) = λxα.x, λys→h(α).Pα(Qα y) = λys→h(α).y.
This allows us to define the PTQ version intPTQα and extPTQα of intensionalization
and extensionalization combinators in terms of intα and extα:
intPTQα = λxs→α.Pα(intαx),
extPTQα = λys→h(α).extα(Qα y).
A direct recursive definition of intPTQα and extPTQα works out as follows:
intPTQa = λxs→a .x,
intPTQα→β = λxs→α→β i s ys→h(α).intPTQβ (λ j s .x j (extPTQα y j))i,
extPTQa = λys→a .y,
extPTQα→β = λys→(s→h(α))→h(β) j s xα.extPTQβ (λi s .yi(intPTQα (λks .x))) j.
Note that if α = α1 → · · · → αn → a, then
intPTQα = λxs→αi s ys→h(α1)1 . . . ys→h(αn)n .xi(extPTQα1 y1 i) . . . (extPTQαn yn i),
extPTQα = λys→h(α) j s xα11 . . . xαnn .y j (intPTQα1 (λks .x1)) . . . (intPTQαn (λks .xn)).
(11)
For example, if j ∈ De, then
intPTQ(e→t)→t (λk
sue→t .uj) = λi s ys→(s→e)→t .yi(λks .j).
This is the simply typed λ-calculus expression corresponding to PTQ’s translation
of John.
A PTQ model M of our object language consists of base domains (Da)s∈A∪{s}
together with an assignment of an intension M(c) ∈ Ds→h(α) to each object language
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constant c of type α. An object language expression ϕ has the intension [[ϕ]]PTQM,g in
a PTQ model M relative to an assignment g of values to variables, where g(vαl ) ∈
Ds→h(α) for every variable vαl of type α:
[[c]]PTQM,g = M(c),
[[vαl ]]PTQM,g = g(vαl ),
[[ϕψ]]PTQM,g = λi s .[[ϕ]]PTQM,gi[[ψ]]PTQM,g,
[[λvαl .ϕ]]PTQM,g = λi s xs→h(α).[[ϕ]]PTQM,g[x/vαl ]i
(12)
Note that these are recursive clauses for the intensions of object language expressions.
In the case of the PTQ fragment, our object language expressions roughly correspond
to meaning recipes associated with analysis trees of English expressions.8
The last two clauses of the above recursive definition can be recast in terms of
extensions (not to be confused with extensionalization), i.e., values of intensions at
particular indices, as follows. Writing [[ϕ]]PTQM,g,i for [[ϕ]]PTQM,gi , we have
[[ϕψ]]PTQM,g,i = [[ϕ]]PTQM,g,i (λi s .[[ψ]]PTQM,g,i ),
[[λvαl .ϕ]]PTQM,g,i = λxs→h(α).[[ϕ]]PTQM,g[x/vαl ],i .
The former says that the extension of ϕψ is the extension of ϕ applied to the intension
of ψ . This semantic recipe was called “intensional functional application” by Heim
and Kratzer (1998), and it appears in PTQ in the form of the Intensional Logic (IL)
expression ϕ′(∧ψ ′), where ϕ′ and ψ ′ translate ϕ and ψ , respectively.
The two intensional interpretations of ϕ are related by the following equations. For
any object language expression ϕ of type γ , we have
[[ϕ]]PTQM,g = Pγ ([[ϕ]]Q◦M,Q◦g) for PTQ model M and PTQ assignment g,
[[ϕ]]M,g = Qγ ([[ϕ]]PTQP◦M,P◦g) for intensional model M and assignment g.
Here, P ◦ M is the PTQ model such that (P ◦ M)(c) = Pα(M(c)) for each constant
c of type α, and P ◦ g is the PTQ assignment such that (P ◦ g)(vαl ) = Pα(g(vαl )) for
each variable vαl . The definitions of Q ◦ M and Q ◦ g are similar. The above equations
can be proved by straightforward induction on ϕ. In particular, when ϕ is a sentence
(i.e., closed object language expression of type t), we have
[[ϕ]]PTQM = [[ϕ]]Q◦M
for every PTQ model M .
As before, given an indexed collection I = (Mi )i∈I of extensional models with
the same base domains (Da)a∈A, we can create a PTQ model MPTQI based on I, with
8 The correspondence is not exact, however, for reasons we choose not to go into here.
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Ds = I , by letting
MPTQI (c) = intPTQα (λi s .Mi (c))
for each object language constant c of type α. Then Q ◦ MPTQI = MI and we can




= λi s .[[ϕ]]Mi = [[ϕ]]MI .
Finally, it may be of some interest to note that intPTQα and extPTQα are definable in
Montague’s (1973) IL. For α = α1 → . . . → αn → a, let
intILα [xs→α] = λys→h(α1)1 . . . ys→h(αn)n .∨x(extILα1 [y1]) . . . (extILαn [yn]),
extILα [ys→h(α)] = λxα11 . . . xαnn .∨y(∧(intILα1 [∧x1])) . . . (∧(intILαn [∧xn])),
where the right-hand sides of the equations are IL expressions and equality is syntactic
equality. Thus, intILα [xs→α] is an IL expression of type h(α) whose only free variable
is x , and extILα [ys→h(α)] is an IL expression of type α whose only free variable is
y. (We write intILα [ϕ], where ϕ is an IL expression of type s → α, for the result of
replacing xs→α by ϕ in intILα [xs→α].) When these IL expressions are translated into
simply typed λ-terms (of type s → h(α) and s → α, respectively), they come out as
equivalent to the following, obtained from (11):
intPTQα xs→α = λi s ys→h(α1)1 . . . ys→h(αn)n .xi(extPTQα1 y1 i) . . . (extPTQαn yn i),
extPTQα y
s→h(α) = λ j s xα11 . . . xαnn .y j (intPTQα1 (λks .x1)) . . . (intPTQαn (λks .xn)).
The translation in question is
xα
† = λks .xα,
(ϕψ)† = λi s .ϕ†i(ψ†i),
(λxα.ϕ)† = λi s xα.ϕ†i,
(∧ϕ)† = λks .ϕ†,
(∨ϕ)† = λi s .ϕ†i i,
which is a straightforward rendering of the semantics of IL given in Montague (1973).9
Note that this translation gives a simply typed λ-term that represents the intension of
9 This translation of IL expressions (without constants) into simply typed λ-calculus must not be confused
with (12), which gives the PTQ-style intensional compositional semantics to expressions of our object
language, which are simply typed λ-terms, not IL expressions.
123
194 P. de Groote, M. Kanazawa
an IL expression, rather than its extension at a particular index, as in Gallin (1975).
We have
(intILα [xs→α])† = intPTQα xs→α,
(extILα [ys→h(α)])† = extPTQα ys→h(α),
which can be proved by straightforward induction. For example, when c is a constant
of IL of an extensional type α, the PTQ-style intensionalization of its intension (which
is an object of type s → α) is given by (the intension of) the IL expression intILα [∧c].
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